74. pepsi-sendmail

Let programs on this host send mail, through the traditional Sendmail interface.

74.1. Role

pepsi-sendmail is the program Debian installs as /usr/sbin/sendmail. It reads a message on standard input and hands it to pepsi-ingress over a local UNIX-domain socket, so that software which expects an MTA to provide that path can send through Pepsi unchanged: cron, mail(1), git send-email, logwatch, PHP’s mail(). Reference: pepsi-sendmail(1).

Without it, a host running Pepsi has no local submission path at all: those programs can only reach port 25, where an unauthenticated client is not a local origin and is refused with 550 5.7.1 Relaying denied for any recipient outside a served domain.

74.2. How Debian arbitrates the sendmail path

Debian does not use update-alternatives for this. Policy §11.6 has every mail transport agent declare:

Provides:  mail-transport-agent
Conflicts: mail-transport-agent
Replaces:  mail-transport-agent

so exactly one MTA can be installed at a time and it simply owns the paths. The pepsi package declares that triple and ships the interface as symlinks to the unified pepsi binary, which dispatches on argv[0] — the same technique that Postfix and exim use:

Path

Behaves as

/usr/sbin/sendmail

the submission client

/usr/lib/sendmail

the same (historical path)

/usr/bin/mailq

sendmail -bp

/usr/bin/newaliases

sendmail -bi (a no-op for Pepsi)

/usr/sbin/rmail

the submission client (UUCP delivery)

Two of those are not full implementations, deliberately. mailq prints no queue, because Pepsi’s queue is a database table that an ordinary user may not read. Instead it refers the caller to pepsi-queue (or pepsi-status) and exits EX_SOFTWARE. newaliases exits 0 having done nothing, because the alias map is a text file that pepsi-stage-aliases re-reads whenever its mtime changes, and package scripts run it unconditionally.

A source make install deliberately does not claim these paths: they belong to whatever MTA the system already has, and taking them over silently would stop its mail delivery with no warning. Pass INSTALL_MTA_LINKS=yes to do it on purpose.

74.3. Why it needs no privilege

Unlike the sendmail commands of Postfix, Exim and sendmail itself, pepsi-sendmail needs no setuid or setgid program.

Postfix’s sendmail hands the message to postdrop, which is setgid postdrop so that it may write into the maildrop spool directory. Pepsi’s queue is a PostgreSQL table reached by peer-authenticated roles, so the equivalent privilege would have to be setuid rather than setgid — a much larger privilege to hand to a program that parses attacker-influenced message headers.

Pepsi avoids the question entirely by moving the identity decision to the server. pepsi-ingress reads the connecting process’s user id from the kernel (SO_PEERCRED, enabled per listener with AUTH_PEERCRED), resolves it to a login, and looks that login up in USERNAME_MAP — exactly as it maps a SASL username arriving on the submission port. The RFC 6409 §6/§8.1 submission-identity rules then apply unchanged.

So pepsi-sendmail is an ordinary unprivileged program (and is folded into the shared pepsi binary like any other), while the guarantees are stronger than a privileged implementation could offer:

  • A caller can only ever send as itself. The kernel supplies the identity; nothing the client says is trusted.

  • The socket can be world-writable, because opening it grants nothing. Deny an account by mapping it to no address in USERNAME_MAP, not with permissions.

  • Nothing on the network gains anything.

The full submission-identity rules are described in pepsi-ingress and under The submission identity in Security model: every From: mailbox is checked, the parse is strict RFC 5322, a display name naming another address is refused, and the Sender: field is fixed up. The adversary that they answer is A local shell user.

Local submitters are also metered, so one account cannot crowd out the others: each uid may hold at most half of [pepsi-ingress] MAX_LOCAL_CONNECTIONS and submit LOCAL_MESSAGES_PER_MINUTE messages (burst LOCAL_MESSAGE_BURST). A refusal there, like queue admission control’s 452 4.3.1, is a temporary one, which pepsi-sendmail turns into EX_TEMPFAIL so cron retries.

74.4. Compared with trusting loopback

The alternative is to put 127.0.0.0/8 ::1/128 in the MX listener’s MYNETWORKS. That authenticates a network position instead of a user:

loopback

sendmail

Who is authenticated

anyone who can open a TCP connection

the specific account, per the kernel

Sender enforcement

none — any process may send as anyone

USERNAME_MAP, as for SASL

Reachable from the network

no (loopback only), but the listener is a network listener

no — a filesystem socket

Self-relay loop risk

yes: a message relayed to this host re-enters as a submission

no

Both are available, but they are not symmetrical choices. The socket is always served, so pepsi-setup --wizard does not ask about it; the one question left is whether to additionally trust loopback. Answer yes only for software that speaks SMTP to 127.0.0.1 and cannot be pointed at the socket.

74.5. Configuration

The client reads [pepsi-sendmail] SOCKET (default /run/pepsi/submission.sock), and so does the server. pepsi-ingress serves that socket unconditionally, synthesising the listener from that one option, so there is no listener section to write and nothing that can disagree with anything else:

[pepsi-sendmail]
SOCKET = /run/pepsi/submission.sock

# ... and that is all. No [pepsi-ingress-listener-*] section.

A host running an MTA is expected to provide /usr/sbin/sendmail, so the socket is not optional. SOCKET = none switches it off for the cases that genuinely want that (a container, an appliance), and failing to bind it is fatal rather than degraded: a server serving only some of what it was asked to serve is a failure, not a partial success.

Under systemd the descriptor is inherited from pepsi-ingress.socket, matched by the address it is bound to rather than by an FD_INDEX. That matters because an index is a position among the unit’s ListenStream= entries, so it shifts whenever a port is added or removed; asking the kernel what each passed descriptor is bound to cannot drift out of step with anything. Off systemd, or for a SOCKET that no unit binds, pepsi-ingress binds the path itself.

Socket activation here is about availability, not privilege, since this is not a privileged port. When the .socket unit binds the socket, systemd creates the node as root, and the node stays available across a service restart, so a concurrent /usr/sbin/sendmail waits rather than failing. /run/pepsi is shared by several services, so no unit claims it as its RuntimeDirectory=; the package’s tmpfiles entry owns it (see No unit may claim it as a RuntimeDirectory).

The synthesised listener is MODE = plain, SUBMISSION = yes and AUTH_PEERCRED = yes, on a socket with mode 0666; none of that is configurable, because none of it is a choice. SUBMISSION = yes brings the RFC 6409 header fixups (a missing Date: or Message-ID: is supplied). A UNIX-domain submission listener is exempt from the usual “submission requires TLS” rule: a filesystem socket has no transport an attacker could observe, and its authentication comes from the kernel rather than the wire, so a certificate would protect nothing. For a listener that is configured with SERVE = systemd, that exemption is checked once the descriptor is resolved rather than at parse time, because the .socket unit sets the socket’s family. pepsi-ingress refuses to start if it turns out to be a network socket.

To give the socket different options, such as a group, a stricter mode or no peer credentials, write a listener section for the same path; it replaces the built-in one rather than colliding with it.

Because submissions are authenticated they carry state.local_origin, so the pepsi-stage-if entry stage of the sample and wizard-built pipelines routes them down the outbound branch, and they are DKIM-signed as the author’s domain.

74.6. See also

pepsi-ingress, pepsi-queue, pepsi-stage-aliases, Getting started on a cheap VPS, pepsi-sendmail(1), pepsi.conf(5).