94. Feature stability

This table lists every feature that Pepsi implements, together with the current evidence of how stable it is. The first three columns are kept by hand in contrib/feature-registry.tsv; the last three come from anonymous, opt-in usage telemetry (see pepsi-telemetry).

  • Automated test — whether, and how, an automated test covers the feature: U (a unit or in-process cargo test), I (an integration test, that is a tests/*.sh script that runs the live pipeline or an end-to-end test in pepsi-test-stages), I/U (both), or - (no automated test yet).

  • Manual — whether someone has also checked the feature by hand (yes/no).

  • Deployments — the number of real-world deployments that have reported the feature as enabled.

  • Uses — the number of times that the feature has actually been used in the field.

  • Stability — a tier derived from the last two columns:

    • stable — deployments ≥ 100 and total uses ≥ 100000

    • used — deployments ≥ 10 and total uses ≥ 1000

    • experimental — otherwise

A feature marked (*) after its name has no telemetry, so its Deployments, Uses and Stability cells show —: no count can be measured for it. Such a feature is a passive protocol capability, a facility that every deployment uses, or an operator command. People run such commands only now and then, and the tiers, which assume counts of messages, cannot rate that.

The counts below come from https://telemetry.pepsi.taler.net/telemetry/report. An instrumented feature with no count in it reads 0 / 0 / experimental: no reporting deployment has exercised it since its telemetry daemon last started. The collector does not authenticate submissions, so read the counts as an indication, not a measurement. No feature has yet been through a dedicated by-hand test pass (Manual = no throughout).

Report generated: 2026-10-13T08:48:36Z

Feature stability

Feature (RFC)

Automated test

Manual

Deployments

Uses

Stability

SMTP server core (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

1

1884

experimental

STARTTLS (RFC 3207)

I/U

no

1

16493

experimental

Implicit TLS / submissions port (RFC 8314)

U

no

1

68

experimental

CHUNKING / BDAT (RFC 3030)

I/U

no

1

200

experimental

SIZE declaration and enforcement (RFC 1870)

I/U

no

1

1674

experimental

PIPELINING (RFC 2920)

I/U

no

1

2052

experimental

ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES (RFC 2034) (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Received trace header (RFC 5321, RFC 3848)

I/U

no

1

1884

experimental

Mail from outside with an ambiguous From:, a served From: or Sender: unauthenticated, or failing DMARC unenforced, marked (X-Pepsi-Warning, [external] tag) (RFC 7489)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Trace header without the submitting client’s address and name, client software fields removed (RECEIVED_PRIVACY) (draft-josefsson-email-received-privacy)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Connection / overload limiting

I/U

no

1

1877

experimental

8BITMIME (RFC 6152)

I/U

no

1

535

experimental

SMTPUTF8 (RFC 6531)

I/U

no

1

130

experimental

Per-hop 8-bit / UTF-8 downgrade (RFC 2045, RFC 2047)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Delivery Status Notifications (RFC 3461, RFC 3463, RFC 3464)

I/U

no

1

1292

experimental

SMTP AUTH (inbound) (RFC 4954)

U

no

1

100

experimental

SMTP AUTH guessing delayed per account once it has collected ACCOUNT_AUTH_FAILURES_PER_HOUR from all sources (never locked)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Message submission / MSA (RFC 6409)

U

no

1

101

experimental

Client authentication (MYNETWORKS / TLS client cert)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

SPF (RFC 7208)

U

no

1

1883

experimental

DKIM verification (RFC 6376, RFC 8463)

I/U

no

1

1329

experimental

DMARC (RFC 7489)

U

no

1

1384

experimental

DMARC aggregate reports about the served domains read (pepsi-stage-dmarc-report) (RFC 7489)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

iprev / FCrDNS (RFC 8601)

U

no

1

1883

experimental

Authentication-Results header (RFC 8601)

U

no

1

1884

experimental

ARC seal and verify (RFC 8617)

I/U

no

1

1783

experimental

Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Forwarded copy sent with a forward return address instead of an SRS one (pepsi-stage-srs) (RFC 3464)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Remote report about a forwarded copy answered with this host’s own DSN, the report dropped (pepsi-ingress) (RFC 3461, RFC 3464)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Outbound DKIM signing (RFC 6376, RFC 8463)

I/U

no

1

194

experimental

Published retired DKIM keys

U

no

0

0

experimental

Direct-to-MX relay (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

1

1983

experimental

Null MX handling (RFC 7505)

U

no

0

0

experimental

MTA-STS (RFC 8461)

U

no

1

94

experimental

Mail client autoconfiguration (config-v1.1.xml) (draft-ietf-mailmaint-autoconfig)

U

no

0

0

experimental

TLS server-identity verification (RFC 6125)

U

no

1

1983

experimental

Smarthost relay (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Smarthost SASL mechanisms (RFC 4954, RFC 4616, RFC 5802, RFC 7628)

U

no

0

0

experimental

DANE / TLSA (RFC 7672)

U

no

1

16

experimental

SMTP TLS Reporting (TLSRPT) (RFC 8460)

I/U

no

1

283

experimental

Maildir local delivery

I/U

no

1

1612

experimental

Mailbox quota enforcement (Maildir++ / quotactl)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailbox quota CLI and reconciliation (pepsi-quota) (*)

I

no

—

—

—

LMTP local delivery + MDA Sieve (RFC 2033, RFC 5228)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

~/.forward processing

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Alias / virtual-map expansion

I/U

no

1

1612

experimental

Milter mail-filter client (post-queue)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Milter consulted in the SMTP session rejected a recipient or a message

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Milter consulted in the SMTP session deferred a recipient or a message (4xx, greylisting)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Recipients refused at RCPT by a milter consulted in the SMTP session

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Messages discarded at the end of the data by a milter consulted in the SMTP session

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Messages a milter consulted in the SMTP session quarantined (stored at the quarantine stage)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Milter consulted in the SMTP session could not be reached, timed out or broke the protocol

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Message held at a quarantine stage until released or deleted (pepsi-stage-quarantine)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Held message released by an operator (pepsi-queue quarantine release)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Quarantine hold ended by MAX_HOLD (EXPIRE_STAGE or deleted)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Greylisting milter: a recipient checked by pepsi-greylist (passed, known, bypassed or denied) (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Greylisting milter: first attempt of a triplet deferred (451 4.7.1) (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Greylisting milter: retry from another host of the same client identity (SPF, MX or network) passed (RFC 7208)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Greylisting milter: decision failed open (database error or DNS timeout)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Pay-to-send anti-spam gate (GNU Taler)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Auto-pay wallet (GNU Taler)

I/U

no

1

101

experimental

Sender whitelist check

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Auto-whitelist (outbound)

I/U

no

1

101

experimental

Language detection

I/U

no

1

1783

experimental

Language blocking

I/U

no

1

1783

experimental

Conditional branch stage

U

no

1

1884

experimental

Edit-settings-by-email

I/U

no

1

101

experimental

Per-address settings overrides

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Bounce generation (RFC 3464)

I/U

no

1

172

experimental

Discard sink

no

0

0

experimental

Single-table queue and crash recovery

I

no

0

0

experimental

Pipelined worker pools and watchdog

I

no

1

1

experimental

Stage fusion

I

no

1

101

experimental

HTTP server (MTA-STS policy + metrics) (RFC 8461)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Prometheus metrics

I

no

0

0

experimental

Provisioning and DNS verification (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Migration from an existing MTA (Postfix/Exim/Sendmail/qmail/Stalwart) (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Queue operator CLI (pepsi-queue) (*)

no

—

—

—

Health summary (pepsi-status) (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Language-detection diagnostics (pepsi-detect-language) (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Local submission socket (peer-credential auth) (RFC 6409)

U

no

1

1

experimental

Sendmail-compatible client (pepsi-sendmail) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Whitelist CLI (pepsi-whitelist) (*)

I

no

—

—

—

Per-user whitelist namespaces (<login>/name) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Whitelist import from a mailbox (mbox/Maildir) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Whitelist import over IMAP (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Whitelist import via doveadm (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Whitelist wildcard proposals + hoster exclusion (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

End-to-end key store (identities, peer keys, CA trust) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Private keys AEAD-wrapped under a secrets.d KEK

U

no

0

0

experimental

Private-key column restricted to the pepsi-crypto role (*)

I

no

—

—

—

Key-store CLI (pepsi-keys) (*)

I

no

—

—

—

OpenPGP key generation (Ed25519 / RSA)

U

no

0

0

experimental

S/MIME certificate + CSR issuance (self-signed)

U

no

0

0

experimental

S/MIME single-certificate mode (CRYPTO_SMIME_SHARED_KEY)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Key discovery: WKD advanced (openpgpkey.<domain>) (draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Key discovery: WKD direct (draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Key discovery: DANE OPENPGPKEY / SMIMEA (RFC 7929, RFC 8162)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Key discovery: verifying key server (VKS)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Key discovery: LDAP directory (feature-gated) (RFC 4511)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Key harvesting from inbound mail + Autocrypt

U

no

0

0

experimental

Key harvesting from inbound mail covered by an aligned DKIM signature

U

no

0

0

experimental

Key learning from Autocrypt-Gossip inside a decrypted message (Autocrypt Level 1)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Park-on-missing-key (asynchronous discovery)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Outbound end-to-end signing and encryption (pepsi-stage-encrypt) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Outbound OpenPGP (PGP/MIME) encryption (RFC 3156, RFC 9580)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Outbound S/MIME (CMS) encryption (RFC 8551, RFC 5083)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Outbound end-to-end signature without encryption (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Per-recipient container downgrade (SEIPDv1 / CBC) (RFC 4880)

U

no

0

0

experimental

S/MIME content key derived with HKDF over the algorithm identifier, for a recipient whose signed capabilities name it (RFC 9709)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Autocrypt key advertisement on outbound mail (Autocrypt Level 1)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Autocrypt key gossip: the other To/Cc recipients’ keys inside the ciphertext (Autocrypt Level 1)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Keyless recipient routed to the secure-link portal

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Recipient held while its key lookup fails in the DNS

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Recipient with inconsistent DNS routed to the portal or bounced instead of cleartext

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Author told which recipients got a message unencrypted (NOTIFY_CLEARTEXT)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Author warned about a subject that only resembles a request keyword

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link fallback portal: store an unencryptable message

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link portal endpoints served by pepsi-httpd

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link message opened with the correct PIN

I

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link PIN refused (lockout counter)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Reply composed through the secure-link portal

I

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link second factor mailed to the sender

U

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link second factor handed to a gateway command

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link with no second factor (link only, weaker)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Identity creation on request (an explicit protection request, or SIGN = always)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

pEp preset: a key generated for a sender on first submission (ENABLE_PEP)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Managed PKI: a user of a managed domain registered by their first submitted message

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

A user’s own (MUA) key registered from a submitted Autocrypt header or key file (Autocrypt Level 1)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Sender’s public key attached as a file (ATTACH_KEYS_AS_FILES) (RFC 3156)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Pepsi’s own notices signed by the deployment (NOTICE_SIGNER) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Key self-service by e-mail (status, generate, register, publish, retire)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Second-factor enrolment reply encrypted to the user’s own key

I

no

0

0

experimental

Second-factor enrolment reply sent in clear (no key of the user’s own)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound end-to-end decryption and signature verification (pepsi-stage-decrypt) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound message actually decrypted (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound OpenPGP (PGP/MIME, inline) decryption (RFC 3156, RFC 9580)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound S/MIME (CMS) decryption (RFC 8551, RFC 5083)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound signature valid against a trusted key (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound signature valid but the key is unanchored (TOFU)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound signature that did not verify

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound ciphertext this host could not open

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound OpenPGP plaintext over the decompression cap

U

no

0

0

experimental

Verified inline clearsigned block that shows unsigned armor header lines or sits in HTML (reported partial, no tag) (RFC 9580)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Signature that verified but was reported valid-untrusted by a binding rule (protected From/Reply-To/forged Subject tag, nameless certificate, display name, several From mailboxes, look-alike domain)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Message without a valid signature from an address whose mail recently carried one (ON_MISSING_SIGNATURE)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Signed protected Subject shown in place of an outer one changed in transit (RFC 9788)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Autocrypt key learning from inbound mail (Autocrypt Level 1)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Keys learnt inline from an inbound message (Autocrypt Level 1)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Re-verification using a certificate found in the plaintext

no

0

0

experimental

Third parties’ keys learnt from a decrypted message’s gossip fields (Autocrypt Level 1)

U

no

0

0

experimental

S/MIME capability records learnt from a correspondent’s signed SMIMECapabilities (RFC 8551)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

A correspondent’s Autocrypt key replaced by a newer one (audited, users notified) (Autocrypt Level 1)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

A newer Autocrypt key refused because the stored one is alive (ACCEPT_ROTATION = expired)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound crypto failure routed to a quarantine stage

U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound crypto failure bounced

U

no

0

0

experimental

Message from a ciphertext without integrity protection dropped instead of bounced (decryption failure, bad signature, no client key, expired quarantine, milter rejection, retries exhausted)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Inbound mail encrypted to a user’s own (MUA) key passed through unopened (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Content beside an encrypted or signed part dropped before decryption (EFAIL, signature wrapping)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Plaintext from an S/MIME container without integrity protection that no signature covers (EFAIL CBC gadgets) (RFC 9787)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Such a message passed on unopened (UNAUTHENTICATED_PLAINTEXT = require-signature, OPEN_ENVELOPED_DATA = no) (RFC 9787)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Remote references in HTML mail neutralised for the recipients who turn it on (pepsi-stage-defang)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Decrypted inbound mail re-encrypted to the recipient’s own (MUA) key for storage (pepsi-stage-reencrypt) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Storage re-encryption to an OpenPGP MUA key (RFC 3156, RFC 9580)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Storage re-encryption to an S/MIME MUA key (RFC 8551, RFC 5083)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Decrypted mail filed in plaintext: the recipient has no MUA key (ON_NO_CLIENT_KEY = plaintext)

I

no

0

0

experimental

A recipient’s MUA key that could not be sealed to

no

0

0

experimental

Decrypted mail refused for want of an MUA key (ON_NO_CLIENT_KEY = bounce) (RFC 3463)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Proof recorded that a correspondent holds our key (stops the key file)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Key publication: Web Key Directory endpoints (draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Key publication: key-server upload + verification retry (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Key publication: auto-confirm the key server’s verification mail

U

no

0

0

experimental

Recipient-domain routing to a next hop (pepsi-stage-route)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Outlook add-in served by pepsi-httpd (manifest, compose pane, read pane)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Per-next-hop IP address family selection (ADDRESS_FAMILY)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Settings CLI (pepsi-settings) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Configuration in the database (scope chain + hot reload)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Config CLI (pepsi-config) (*)

I

no

—

—

—

Encrypted configuration export/import (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Failure bouncer (pepsi-failure-bouncer)

no

0

0

experimental

Smarthost OAuth token-refresh helper (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Structured logging (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Feature telemetry (*)

U

no

—

—

—

Administrative REST API (/api/v1)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Administration web console (/ui)

U

no

0

0

experimental

TOTP second factor on console password sign-in, checked by the setup applier (RFC 6238)

U

no

0

0

experimental

WebAuthn security key as the second factor of a console or e-mail-enrolled sign-in (W3C WebAuthn)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

WebAuthn security key as the second factor of a list member sign-in (W3C WebAuthn)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Setup interview driven from the web console

U

no

0

0

experimental

Secure-link messages browsed from the web console

U

no

0

0

experimental

Correspondent key imported through the API (POST /api/v1/peers)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Discovery lookup queued through the API (POST /api/v1/peers/discover)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Correspondent key re-check through the API (POST /api/v1/peers/{id}/recheck)

I

no

0

0

experimental

Administrative audit log

U

no

0

0

experimental

Opt-in per-message log ([pepsi] MAIL_LOG)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Browser-driven setup (/api/v1/setup + pepsi-setup apply)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Non-interactive wizard (pepsi-setup –answers)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Vacation / out-of-office auto-reply (RFC 3834)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Confirm-to-send challenge for unknown senders (pepsi-stage-secretary) (RFC 3834)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

A null-sender message without a Pepsi-Origin proof held back by confirm-to-send (pepsi-stage-secretary)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailing lists: domains, lists, members, owners, bans (pepsi-list) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Mailing-list archive storage (hash-partitioned, full-text + trigram) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

Mailing-list routing (pepsi-stage-list)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailing-list posting: moderation chain, handler pipeline and fan-out (pepsi-stage-list-post)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailing-list per-member delivery: one-click unsubscribe, decoration (pepsi-stage-list-deliver)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailing-list e-mail commands: join, leave, confirm and the subscription workflows (pepsi-stage-list-command)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailing-list bounce processing: VERP attribution, 17 detectors, scoring (pepsi-stage-list-bounce)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

A bounce to a forged or codeless VERP address dropped unscored (pepsi-stage-list-bounce)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Mailing-list archive: ingest, threading, the two search mechanisms, purge and export (pepsi-archive) (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

The GNU Mailman 3 REST API (/3.0/ and /3.1/) – upstream 3.3.10, gated on mailmanclient and Postorius’s own suites

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

The public mailing-list web interface: index, subscribe/unsubscribe forms, archive browsing and search

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe (List-Unsubscribe-Post), honoured whatever the unsubscription policy says (RFC 8058)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Member accounts on the public list site: registration, address verification, passwords and password reset, and the member’s own subscription pages

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

The list owner and moderator console: held messages, subscription requests, the generated settings screens, the roster, bans and header matches – authorised by a roster query, not by an operator account

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Importing a running GNU Mailman 3 site over its own REST API: domains, lists, users, addresses, members, bans and header matches

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Importing a Mailman 2.1 site from its config.pck files, with upstream’s own attribute mapping and a pickle reader that constructs nothing

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Importing an mbox archive, with the cleanarch repairs in the reader and an automatic thread rebuild

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

The cutover invitation mailing: a rate, a resume and a per-domain dry run

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Both digest formats: MIME multipart/digest and RFC 1153 plain, with the volume/number rule and a periodic timer (RFC 1153)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

The posting-address autoresponder, including respond_and_discard (RFC 3834)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Discarding held messages past max_days_to_hold – an attribute that is inert in GNU Mailman 3

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

The 28 GNU Mailman notice templates in all ten shipped languages, with the placeholder audit that catches a translated placeholder name (*)

U

no

—

—

—

The public list and archive pages in English, German and French, chosen from Accept-Language in q-order before any database access (*)

I/U

no

—

—

—

The secure-link portal’s pages, its three mails and their subject lines in all ten shipped languages: the mails in the language detected on the message, the pages from Accept-Language (*)

U

no

—

—

—

The administration console in all ten shipped languages, chosen from Accept-Language by the same rule as the public pages (*)

U

no

—

—

—

No DSN to an unauthenticated sender (backscatter guard) (RFC 3464)

U

no

1

83

experimental

Routing-loop refusal (MAX_SELF_HOPS) (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Header-field limits refused at end of data (MAX_HEADER_FIELDS, MAX_HEADER_FIELD_SIZE) (RFC 5322)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Ambiguous MIME refused at DATA (MIME_ANOMALIES) (RFC 2045, RFC 2046)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Ambiguous MIME rewritten to its RFC reading (MIME_ANOMALIES) (RFC 2045, RFC 2046)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Differing copies of a singleton header field marked (X-Pepsi-Warning, MIME_ANOMALIES) (RFC 5322)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Unknown recipients refused at RCPT (VERIFY_RECIPIENTS) (RFC 5321)

I/U

no

1

75

experimental

Require-Recipient-Valid-Since: the RRVS RCPT parameter and header field (RFC 7293)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Recipients refused because their address changed owner after the RRVS date (RFC 7293)

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Require TLS: messages tagged REQUIRETLS or TLS-Required: No at ingress (RFC 8689)

U

no

0

0

experimental

Outbound mail of an Exchange Online tenant relayed after a tenant proof

I/U

no

0

0

experimental

Relaying refused to mail that does not prove its Exchange Online tenant

I/U

no

0

0

experimental