94. Feature stability¶
This table lists every feature that Pepsi implements, together with the
current evidence of how stable it is. The first three columns are kept by hand
in contrib/feature-registry.tsv; the last three come from anonymous, opt-in
usage telemetry (see pepsi-telemetry).
Automated test — whether, and how, an automated test covers the feature:
U(a unit or in-processcargo test),I(an integration test, that is atests/*.shscript that runs the live pipeline or an end-to-end test inpepsi-test-stages),I/U(both), or-(no automated test yet).Manual — whether someone has also checked the feature by hand (
yes/no).Deployments — the number of real-world deployments that have reported the feature as enabled.
Uses — the number of times that the feature has actually been used in the field.
Stability — a tier derived from the last two columns:
stable — deployments ≥ 100 and total uses ≥ 100000
used — deployments ≥ 10 and total uses ≥ 1000
experimental — otherwise
A feature marked (*) after its name has no telemetry, so its
Deployments, Uses and Stability cells show —: no count can be
measured for it. Such a feature is a passive protocol capability, a facility
that every deployment uses, or an operator command. People run such commands
only now and then, and the tiers, which assume counts of messages, cannot rate
that.
The counts below come from
https://telemetry.pepsi.taler.net/telemetry/report. An instrumented feature with no
count in it reads 0 / 0 / experimental: no reporting deployment
has exercised it since its telemetry daemon last started. The collector does not
authenticate submissions, so read the counts as an indication, not a
measurement. No feature has yet been through a dedicated by-hand test
pass (Manual = no throughout).
Report generated: 2026-10-13T08:48:36Z
Feature (RFC) |
Automated test |
Manual |
Deployments |
Uses |
Stability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SMTP server core (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1884 |
experimental |
STARTTLS (RFC 3207) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
16493 |
experimental |
Implicit TLS / submissions port (RFC 8314) |
U |
no |
1 |
68 |
experimental |
CHUNKING / BDAT (RFC 3030) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
200 |
experimental |
SIZE declaration and enforcement (RFC 1870) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1674 |
experimental |
PIPELINING (RFC 2920) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
2052 |
experimental |
ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES (RFC 2034) (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Received trace header (RFC 5321, RFC 3848) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1884 |
experimental |
Mail from outside with an ambiguous From:, a served From: or Sender: unauthenticated, or failing DMARC unenforced, marked (X-Pepsi-Warning, [external] tag) (RFC 7489) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Trace header without the submitting client’s address and name, client software fields removed (RECEIVED_PRIVACY) (draft-josefsson-email-received-privacy) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Connection / overload limiting |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1877 |
experimental |
8BITMIME (RFC 6152) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
535 |
experimental |
SMTPUTF8 (RFC 6531) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
130 |
experimental |
Per-hop 8-bit / UTF-8 downgrade (RFC 2045, RFC 2047) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Delivery Status Notifications (RFC 3461, RFC 3463, RFC 3464) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1292 |
experimental |
SMTP AUTH (inbound) (RFC 4954) |
U |
no |
1 |
100 |
experimental |
SMTP AUTH guessing delayed per account once it has collected ACCOUNT_AUTH_FAILURES_PER_HOUR from all sources (never locked) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Message submission / MSA (RFC 6409) |
U |
no |
1 |
101 |
experimental |
Client authentication (MYNETWORKS / TLS client cert) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
SPF (RFC 7208) |
U |
no |
1 |
1883 |
experimental |
DKIM verification (RFC 6376, RFC 8463) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1329 |
experimental |
DMARC (RFC 7489) |
U |
no |
1 |
1384 |
experimental |
DMARC aggregate reports about the served domains read (pepsi-stage-dmarc-report) (RFC 7489) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
iprev / FCrDNS (RFC 8601) |
U |
no |
1 |
1883 |
experimental |
Authentication-Results header (RFC 8601) |
U |
no |
1 |
1884 |
experimental |
ARC seal and verify (RFC 8617) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1783 |
experimental |
Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Forwarded copy sent with a forward return address instead of an SRS one (pepsi-stage-srs) (RFC 3464) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Remote report about a forwarded copy answered with this host’s own DSN, the report dropped (pepsi-ingress) (RFC 3461, RFC 3464) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outbound DKIM signing (RFC 6376, RFC 8463) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
194 |
experimental |
Published retired DKIM keys |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Direct-to-MX relay (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1983 |
experimental |
Null MX handling (RFC 7505) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) |
U |
no |
1 |
94 |
experimental |
Mail client autoconfiguration (config-v1.1.xml) (draft-ietf-mailmaint-autoconfig) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
TLS server-identity verification (RFC 6125) |
U |
no |
1 |
1983 |
experimental |
Smarthost relay (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Smarthost SASL mechanisms (RFC 4954, RFC 4616, RFC 5802, RFC 7628) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
DANE / TLSA (RFC 7672) |
U |
no |
1 |
16 |
experimental |
SMTP TLS Reporting (TLSRPT) (RFC 8460) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
283 |
experimental |
Maildir local delivery |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1612 |
experimental |
Mailbox quota enforcement (Maildir++ / quotactl) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailbox quota CLI and reconciliation (pepsi-quota) (*) |
I |
no |
— |
— |
— |
LMTP local delivery + MDA Sieve (RFC 2033, RFC 5228) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
~/.forward processing |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Alias / virtual-map expansion |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1612 |
experimental |
Milter mail-filter client (post-queue) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Milter consulted in the SMTP session rejected a recipient or a message |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Milter consulted in the SMTP session deferred a recipient or a message (4xx, greylisting) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Recipients refused at RCPT by a milter consulted in the SMTP session |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Messages discarded at the end of the data by a milter consulted in the SMTP session |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Messages a milter consulted in the SMTP session quarantined (stored at the quarantine stage) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Milter consulted in the SMTP session could not be reached, timed out or broke the protocol |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Message held at a quarantine stage until released or deleted (pepsi-stage-quarantine) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Held message released by an operator (pepsi-queue quarantine release) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Quarantine hold ended by MAX_HOLD (EXPIRE_STAGE or deleted) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Greylisting milter: a recipient checked by pepsi-greylist (passed, known, bypassed or denied) (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Greylisting milter: first attempt of a triplet deferred (451 4.7.1) (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Greylisting milter: retry from another host of the same client identity (SPF, MX or network) passed (RFC 7208) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Greylisting milter: decision failed open (database error or DNS timeout) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Pay-to-send anti-spam gate (GNU Taler) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Auto-pay wallet (GNU Taler) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
101 |
experimental |
Sender whitelist check |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Auto-whitelist (outbound) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
101 |
experimental |
Language detection |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1783 |
experimental |
Language blocking |
I/U |
no |
1 |
1783 |
experimental |
Conditional branch stage |
U |
no |
1 |
1884 |
experimental |
Edit-settings-by-email |
I/U |
no |
1 |
101 |
experimental |
Per-address settings overrides |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Bounce generation (RFC 3464) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
172 |
experimental |
Discard sink |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
|
Single-table queue and crash recovery |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Pipelined worker pools and watchdog |
I |
no |
1 |
1 |
experimental |
Stage fusion |
I |
no |
1 |
101 |
experimental |
HTTP server (MTA-STS policy + metrics) (RFC 8461) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Prometheus metrics |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Provisioning and DNS verification (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Migration from an existing MTA (Postfix/Exim/Sendmail/qmail/Stalwart) (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Queue operator CLI (pepsi-queue) (*) |
no |
— |
— |
— |
|
Health summary (pepsi-status) (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Language-detection diagnostics (pepsi-detect-language) (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Local submission socket (peer-credential auth) (RFC 6409) |
U |
no |
1 |
1 |
experimental |
Sendmail-compatible client (pepsi-sendmail) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Whitelist CLI (pepsi-whitelist) (*) |
I |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Per-user whitelist namespaces (<login>/name) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Whitelist import from a mailbox (mbox/Maildir) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Whitelist import over IMAP (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Whitelist import via doveadm (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Whitelist wildcard proposals + hoster exclusion (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
End-to-end key store (identities, peer keys, CA trust) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Private keys AEAD-wrapped under a secrets.d KEK |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Private-key column restricted to the pepsi-crypto role (*) |
I |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Key-store CLI (pepsi-keys) (*) |
I |
no |
— |
— |
— |
OpenPGP key generation (Ed25519 / RSA) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
S/MIME certificate + CSR issuance (self-signed) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
S/MIME single-certificate mode (CRYPTO_SMIME_SHARED_KEY) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key discovery: WKD advanced (openpgpkey.<domain>) (draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key discovery: WKD direct (draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key discovery: DANE OPENPGPKEY / SMIMEA (RFC 7929, RFC 8162) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key discovery: verifying key server (VKS) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key discovery: LDAP directory (feature-gated) (RFC 4511) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key harvesting from inbound mail + Autocrypt |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key harvesting from inbound mail covered by an aligned DKIM signature |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key learning from Autocrypt-Gossip inside a decrypted message (Autocrypt Level 1) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Park-on-missing-key (asynchronous discovery) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outbound end-to-end signing and encryption (pepsi-stage-encrypt) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outbound OpenPGP (PGP/MIME) encryption (RFC 3156, RFC 9580) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outbound S/MIME (CMS) encryption (RFC 8551, RFC 5083) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outbound end-to-end signature without encryption (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Per-recipient container downgrade (SEIPDv1 / CBC) (RFC 4880) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
S/MIME content key derived with HKDF over the algorithm identifier, for a recipient whose signed capabilities name it (RFC 9709) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Autocrypt key advertisement on outbound mail (Autocrypt Level 1) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Autocrypt key gossip: the other To/Cc recipients’ keys inside the ciphertext (Autocrypt Level 1) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Keyless recipient routed to the secure-link portal |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Recipient held while its key lookup fails in the DNS |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Recipient with inconsistent DNS routed to the portal or bounced instead of cleartext |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Author told which recipients got a message unencrypted (NOTIFY_CLEARTEXT) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Author warned about a subject that only resembles a request keyword |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link fallback portal: store an unencryptable message |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link portal endpoints served by pepsi-httpd |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link message opened with the correct PIN |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link PIN refused (lockout counter) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Reply composed through the secure-link portal |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link second factor mailed to the sender |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link second factor handed to a gateway command |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
|
Secure-link with no second factor (link only, weaker) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Identity creation on request (an explicit protection request, or SIGN = always) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
pEp preset: a key generated for a sender on first submission (ENABLE_PEP) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Managed PKI: a user of a managed domain registered by their first submitted message |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
A user’s own (MUA) key registered from a submitted Autocrypt header or key file (Autocrypt Level 1) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Sender’s public key attached as a file (ATTACH_KEYS_AS_FILES) (RFC 3156) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Pepsi’s own notices signed by the deployment (NOTICE_SIGNER) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key self-service by e-mail (status, generate, register, publish, retire) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Second-factor enrolment reply encrypted to the user’s own key |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Second-factor enrolment reply sent in clear (no key of the user’s own) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound end-to-end decryption and signature verification (pepsi-stage-decrypt) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound message actually decrypted (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound OpenPGP (PGP/MIME, inline) decryption (RFC 3156, RFC 9580) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound S/MIME (CMS) decryption (RFC 8551, RFC 5083) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound signature valid against a trusted key (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound signature valid but the key is unanchored (TOFU) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound signature that did not verify |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound ciphertext this host could not open |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound OpenPGP plaintext over the decompression cap |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Verified inline clearsigned block that shows unsigned armor header lines or sits in HTML (reported partial, no tag) (RFC 9580) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Signature that verified but was reported valid-untrusted by a binding rule (protected From/Reply-To/forged Subject tag, nameless certificate, display name, several From mailboxes, look-alike domain) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Message without a valid signature from an address whose mail recently carried one (ON_MISSING_SIGNATURE) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Signed protected Subject shown in place of an outer one changed in transit (RFC 9788) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Autocrypt key learning from inbound mail (Autocrypt Level 1) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Keys learnt inline from an inbound message (Autocrypt Level 1) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Re-verification using a certificate found in the plaintext |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
|
Third parties’ keys learnt from a decrypted message’s gossip fields (Autocrypt Level 1) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
S/MIME capability records learnt from a correspondent’s signed SMIMECapabilities (RFC 8551) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
A correspondent’s Autocrypt key replaced by a newer one (audited, users notified) (Autocrypt Level 1) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
A newer Autocrypt key refused because the stored one is alive (ACCEPT_ROTATION = expired) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound crypto failure routed to a quarantine stage |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound crypto failure bounced |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Message from a ciphertext without integrity protection dropped instead of bounced (decryption failure, bad signature, no client key, expired quarantine, milter rejection, retries exhausted) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Inbound mail encrypted to a user’s own (MUA) key passed through unopened (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Content beside an encrypted or signed part dropped before decryption (EFAIL, signature wrapping) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Plaintext from an S/MIME container without integrity protection that no signature covers (EFAIL CBC gadgets) (RFC 9787) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Such a message passed on unopened (UNAUTHENTICATED_PLAINTEXT = require-signature, OPEN_ENVELOPED_DATA = no) (RFC 9787) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Remote references in HTML mail neutralised for the recipients who turn it on (pepsi-stage-defang) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Decrypted inbound mail re-encrypted to the recipient’s own (MUA) key for storage (pepsi-stage-reencrypt) (RFC 3156, RFC 8551) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Storage re-encryption to an OpenPGP MUA key (RFC 3156, RFC 9580) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Storage re-encryption to an S/MIME MUA key (RFC 8551, RFC 5083) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Decrypted mail filed in plaintext: the recipient has no MUA key (ON_NO_CLIENT_KEY = plaintext) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
A recipient’s MUA key that could not be sealed to |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
|
Decrypted mail refused for want of an MUA key (ON_NO_CLIENT_KEY = bounce) (RFC 3463) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Proof recorded that a correspondent holds our key (stops the key file) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key publication: Web Key Directory endpoints (draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Key publication: key-server upload + verification retry (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Key publication: auto-confirm the key server’s verification mail |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Recipient-domain routing to a next hop (pepsi-stage-route) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outlook add-in served by pepsi-httpd (manifest, compose pane, read pane) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Per-next-hop IP address family selection (ADDRESS_FAMILY) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Settings CLI (pepsi-settings) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Configuration in the database (scope chain + hot reload) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Config CLI (pepsi-config) (*) |
I |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Encrypted configuration export/import (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Failure bouncer (pepsi-failure-bouncer) |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
|
Smarthost OAuth token-refresh helper (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Structured logging (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Feature telemetry (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Administrative REST API (/api/v1) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Administration web console (/ui) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
TOTP second factor on console password sign-in, checked by the setup applier (RFC 6238) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
WebAuthn security key as the second factor of a console or e-mail-enrolled sign-in (W3C WebAuthn) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
WebAuthn security key as the second factor of a list member sign-in (W3C WebAuthn) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Setup interview driven from the web console |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Secure-link messages browsed from the web console |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Correspondent key imported through the API (POST /api/v1/peers) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Discovery lookup queued through the API (POST /api/v1/peers/discover) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Correspondent key re-check through the API (POST /api/v1/peers/{id}/recheck) |
I |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Administrative audit log |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Opt-in per-message log ([pepsi] MAIL_LOG) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Browser-driven setup (/api/v1/setup + pepsi-setup apply) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Non-interactive wizard (pepsi-setup –answers) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Vacation / out-of-office auto-reply (RFC 3834) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Confirm-to-send challenge for unknown senders (pepsi-stage-secretary) (RFC 3834) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
A null-sender message without a Pepsi-Origin proof held back by confirm-to-send (pepsi-stage-secretary) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailing lists: domains, lists, members, owners, bans (pepsi-list) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Mailing-list archive storage (hash-partitioned, full-text + trigram) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
Mailing-list routing (pepsi-stage-list) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailing-list posting: moderation chain, handler pipeline and fan-out (pepsi-stage-list-post) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailing-list per-member delivery: one-click unsubscribe, decoration (pepsi-stage-list-deliver) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailing-list e-mail commands: join, leave, confirm and the subscription workflows (pepsi-stage-list-command) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailing-list bounce processing: VERP attribution, 17 detectors, scoring (pepsi-stage-list-bounce) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
A bounce to a forged or codeless VERP address dropped unscored (pepsi-stage-list-bounce) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Mailing-list archive: ingest, threading, the two search mechanisms, purge and export (pepsi-archive) (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
The GNU Mailman 3 REST API (/3.0/ and /3.1/) – upstream 3.3.10, gated on mailmanclient and Postorius’s own suites |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
The public mailing-list web interface: index, subscribe/unsubscribe forms, archive browsing and search |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe (List-Unsubscribe-Post), honoured whatever the unsubscription policy says (RFC 8058) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Member accounts on the public list site: registration, address verification, passwords and password reset, and the member’s own subscription pages |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
The list owner and moderator console: held messages, subscription requests, the generated settings screens, the roster, bans and header matches – authorised by a roster query, not by an operator account |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Importing a running GNU Mailman 3 site over its own REST API: domains, lists, users, addresses, members, bans and header matches |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Importing a Mailman 2.1 site from its config.pck files, with upstream’s own attribute mapping and a pickle reader that constructs nothing |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Importing an mbox archive, with the cleanarch repairs in the reader and an automatic thread rebuild |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
The cutover invitation mailing: a rate, a resume and a per-domain dry run |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Both digest formats: MIME multipart/digest and RFC 1153 plain, with the volume/number rule and a periodic timer (RFC 1153) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
The posting-address autoresponder, including respond_and_discard (RFC 3834) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Discarding held messages past max_days_to_hold – an attribute that is inert in GNU Mailman 3 |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
The 28 GNU Mailman notice templates in all ten shipped languages, with the placeholder audit that catches a translated placeholder name (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
The public list and archive pages in English, German and French, chosen from Accept-Language in q-order before any database access (*) |
I/U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
The secure-link portal’s pages, its three mails and their subject lines in all ten shipped languages: the mails in the language detected on the message, the pages from Accept-Language (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
The administration console in all ten shipped languages, chosen from Accept-Language by the same rule as the public pages (*) |
U |
no |
— |
— |
— |
No DSN to an unauthenticated sender (backscatter guard) (RFC 3464) |
U |
no |
1 |
83 |
experimental |
Routing-loop refusal (MAX_SELF_HOPS) (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Header-field limits refused at end of data (MAX_HEADER_FIELDS, MAX_HEADER_FIELD_SIZE) (RFC 5322) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Ambiguous MIME refused at DATA (MIME_ANOMALIES) (RFC 2045, RFC 2046) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Ambiguous MIME rewritten to its RFC reading (MIME_ANOMALIES) (RFC 2045, RFC 2046) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Differing copies of a singleton header field marked (X-Pepsi-Warning, MIME_ANOMALIES) (RFC 5322) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Unknown recipients refused at RCPT (VERIFY_RECIPIENTS) (RFC 5321) |
I/U |
no |
1 |
75 |
experimental |
Require-Recipient-Valid-Since: the RRVS RCPT parameter and header field (RFC 7293) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Recipients refused because their address changed owner after the RRVS date (RFC 7293) |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Require TLS: messages tagged REQUIRETLS or TLS-Required: No at ingress (RFC 8689) |
U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Outbound mail of an Exchange Online tenant relayed after a tenant proof |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |
Relaying refused to mail that does not prove its Exchange Online tenant |
I/U |
no |
0 |
0 |
experimental |