42. pepsi-stage-relay-to-internet¶
Direct-to-MX delivery with MTA-STS.
42.1. Role¶
pepsi-stage-relay-to-internet delivers a message directly to the recipient
domain’s mail exchangers, doing its own MX discovery and TLS policy enforcement.
It is one of the two interchangeable delivery stages. Reference:
pepsi-stage-relay-to-internet(1).
42.2. Features¶
42.2.1. MX discovery (RFC 5321 / RFC 7505)¶
The stage does its own
MXlookup and tries the hosts in ascending preference (equal preference in random order); a domain with noMXfalls back to its address records (implicit MX, RFC 5321 §5.1).Null MX (RFC 7505,
0 .) and a non-existent domain are permanent failures, never retries.Happy-Eyeballs address selection across A/AAAA, intersected with
ADDRESS_FAMILY; resolved addresses are cached per address (with connect health) in thepepsi.dns_addresstable, so a working address is preferred until its DNS TTL elapses.
42.2.2. Transport security (RFC 8461 / RFC 6125)¶
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) discovery and enforcement (unless
MTA_STS = no): anenforcepolicy restricts delivery to listed MX hosts overSTARTTLSwith a certificate that validates for the host (RFC 6125). Atestingpolicy is validated the same way and the outcome recorded for TLS Reporting, but a failure falls back to opportunisticSTARTTLSover all MX hosts; with no policy, delivery uses opportunisticSTARTTLS. Policy lookups fail open only when nothing is cached, and such a failed fetch is reported through TLSRPT (sts-policy-fetch-error, orsts-webpki-invalidfor a certificate failure). The policy is fetched only from a public address (a policy host resolving to loopback or a private range is not contacted, which counts as a failed fetch). Fetched policies are cached for theirmax_age(capped at a week) in thepepsi.mta_sts_policytable, so they survive worker recycling and restarts (RFC 8461 section 5.1);pepsi-queue gcdeletes expired ones. A cached policy is fetched again on use once less than half of that lifetime remains, whatever the_mta-stsrecord says (RFC 8461 section 10.2). A successful fetch stores the policy for its full lifetime again. A failed one keeps the cached policy; it is retried after five minutes and logged as a warning once less than a quarter of the lifetime remains. The hourlypepsi-queue gcrefreshes every stored policy under the same rules without waiting for a message (section 10.2), so a rarely mailed domain does not lapse back to first contact. Themta-stssubcommand prints the applicable policy as a fresh fetch finds it, ignoring the cache.DANE/TLSA (RFC 7672), per MX host:
DANE = off | warn | strict, defaultstrict(warnis an explicit opt-out from RFC 7672’s refusal). When usable TLSA records exist and the MX RRset is DNSSEC-secure, they take precedence over MTA-STS for that connection, except thatwarnmode never replaces anenforceMTA-STS policy’s PKIX validation. Pepsi reads the resolver’s AD bit and does not validate DNSSEC itself; a worker started with DANE on warns when that resolver is neither on loopback nor reached over DNS over TLS or HTTPS, or does not set the AD bit on a signed probe answer. A mismatch with usable records defers delivery understrictand only warns underwarn(delivery then uses the certificate check that applies without DANE, and TLSRPT records the session astlsa-invalid). Any secureTLSARRset, usable or not, makesSTARTTLSmandatory in both modes (RFC 7672 section 2.2): when a host does not offer it, the message is deferred instead of being sent in cleartext. Where one usage and selector are published under both SHA-256 and SHA-512, only the SHA-512 records are matched (RFC 7671 section 9).Stapled OCSP (RFC 6960): on a PKIX-validated hop, and under a
DANE-TAmatch, an OCSP response that the MX staples is verified and arevokedanswer refuses the session (aDANE-EEmatch is not asked); nothing is queried, and a hop that staples nothing is not checked.Require TLS (RFC 8689): a message tagged
state.tls_required = "required"by ingress (theREQUIRETLSparameter) goes only to an MX host whose name is validated by DNSSEC or an MTA-STS policy, over mandatorySTARTTLSwith the certificate authenticated by DANE or PKIX, and only if the host then advertisesREQUIRETLS; the parameter is passed on. Each MX host is tried in turn. When none qualifies, the message bounces with5.7.30or5.7.10; this bounce is itself tagged and returns headers only. A message tagged"no"(TLS-Required: No) is delivered opportunistically to every MX host, with the domain’s policy treated as advisory, and is not reported through TLSRPT.
42.2.3. Delivery, retry and bounce¶
Sends with the message’s own envelope sender (null sender for bounces), one recipient per attempt: a multi-recipient row is first split into one row per recipient.
On success, finishes the row (or advances to
NEXT_STAGE).Exponential backoff on transient failure (
RETRY_INITIAL/RETRY_MAX_INTERVAL/RETRY_FACTOR); pastMAX_LIFETIMEa transient failure becomes permanent.Loop detection via
MAX_HOP_COUNTReceived:headers.A permanent failure of an ordinary message routes to
BOUNCE_STAGE(or marks the rowfailed). A permanent failure of a bounce is never re-bounced: a copy goes toPOSTMASTERif that is set, and otherwise it is discarded.
42.2.4. DSN propagation and origination (RFC 3461)¶
Propagates
RET/ENVID/NOTIFY/ORCPTto the MX only when it advertisesDSN.On permanent failure, hands the recipient’s
NOTIFY/ORCPT/ENVIDto the bounce stage so a failure DSN is generated only when requested.Success DSN (
Action: delivered) whenORIGINATE_SUCCESS_DSN+NOTIFY=SUCCESS; delay DSN (Action: delayed, once) whenDELAY_DSN_AFTERelapses andNOTIFY=DELAY.RRVS (RFC 7293): a recipient’s
RRVS=parameter is passed on when the MX advertisesRRVS; otherwise the default actionRfails that recipient with5.7.19andCwrites the request as aRequire-Recipient-Valid-Since:field naming only that recipient.
42.2.5. Proof of origin¶
With
[pepsi-origin]configured (the default), every outbound message is stamped with an unsignedPepsi-Originheader (an HMAC over the sender account, a nonce recorded inpepsi.origin_nonce, a timestamp and the host name), so pepsi-stage-anti-spam can recognise a returning bounce as a reply to mail Pepsi sent. A nonce that cannot be recorded holds the message back for a retry rather than sending an unverifiable stamp.
42.2.6. Content adaptation (RFC 6152 / RFC 6531)¶
Matches the message to the extensions the MX advertises: re-advertises
BODY=8BITMIME/SMTPUTF8when supported, otherwise downgrades the body (RFC 2045) and UTF-8 headers (RFC 2047). A non-ASCII address that cannot be represented to a non-SMTPUTF8hop is bounced, and so is a body that is still 8-bit after the downgrade, because RFC 6152 §3 permits no attempt to send it.
42.3. Configuration¶
[stage-<name>] with PROGRAM = pepsi-stage-relay-to-internet:
SERVER_NAME (required), NEXT_STAGE/BOUNCE_STAGE, POSTMASTER, the
timeouts (CONNECT_TIMEOUT/COMMAND_TIMEOUT/DATA_TIMEOUT), the retry
policy (RETRY_INITIAL/RETRY_MAX_INTERVAL/RETRY_FACTOR/MAX_LIFETIME/
DELAY_DSN_AFTER), MAX_HOP_COUNT, DNS (DNS_SERVERS/DNS_TIMEOUT),
MTA-STS (MTA_STS/MTA_STS_TIMEOUT), DANE and ADDRESS_FAMILY.
Durations must use h/m/s units. Full reference:
pepsi-stage-relay-to-internet(1).
42.4. State¶
Inputs:
state.dsn(propagation + report gating),state.origin(8BITMIME/SMTPUTF8 hints) andstate.tls_required(RFC 8689).Outputs:
attempts/last_error/delay_senton pause; astate.bounceobject (permanent/success/delay) when routing to or enqueuing for the bounce stage;last_erroron terminalfail.state.dsnandstate.originare preserved.
42.5. Security¶
An active network attacker and The network adversary state the transport-security
guarantees and their limits: what an active network attacker gets with and
without MTA-STS enforce or DANE records, and why the resolver must validate
DNSSEC on loopback or over an authenticated channel. The MTA-STS policy fetch shares the
public-address check described under “Key-discovery SSRF” in
Security model.
42.6. See also¶
pepsi-stage-relay-to-smarthost, pepsi-stage-bounce, Supported Features, pepsi-stage-relay-to-internet(1).